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50TH ANNUAL WILLIAM H. LEARY LECTURE 






It is a tremendous honor to have been asked to deliver the 50th annual William 
H. Leary Lecture. In honor of this wonderful occasion, I want to identify what I think 
are five of the most important changes in constitutional law over the last five decades 
and then conclude by suggesting for you what I think are the five most 
underappreciated Supreme Court cases for the last fifty years. To put this in some 
context, over the last fifty years, fifteen justices have been appointed and confirmed 
for the Supreme Court.1 Ten have been appointed by republican presidents; five were 
appointed by democratic presidents.2 The earliest during this time confirmed for the 
Supreme Court was Justice Thurgood Marshall.3 The most recent, of course, is 
Justice Elena Kagan in the year 2010.4 All three of the Chief Justices, who have 
assumed that role on the Supreme Court in the last fifty years, were appointed by 
republican presidents: Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, and now John Roberts.5 
And the fact that ten of fifteen vacancies were filled by republican presidents, only 
five by democrats, certainly shapes everything that’s occurred over the last five 
decades.  
 
I.  THE FIVE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
A.  The Emergence of Unenumerated Rights 
 
The first important development has been the debate over unenumerated rights 
in the Constitution. I did some quick Westlaw research—I’m admittedly not very 
good on Westlaw—but I tried to see if the words originalism and non-originalism 
ever appeared earlier than 1966. I could find no law review article, no Supreme 
Court case that ever used those words. Now, over the last several decades, certainly 
constitutional scholars, yet also Supreme Court justices have been in a debate over 
constitutional interpretation. The debate has been especially with regard to the 
                                                
* © 2016 Erwin Chemerinsky. 
1 See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S. (last 
visited July 27, 2016) http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/5WTB-H82T] [hereinafter: Members of the Supreme Court].  
2 See id. 
3 See Supreme Court Nominations, Present–1789, U.S. SENATE (last visited July 27, 
2016) http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm 
[https://perma.cc/FP4B-FDFH] [hereinafter: Supreme Court Nominations]. 
4 See id. 
5 See Members of the Supreme Court, supra note 1. 
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appropriateness of the Supreme Court protecting rights that aren’t expressly 
mentioned in the Constitution.  
Originalism is the view that the meaning of a constitutional provision is fixed 
when it is adopted and that it can be changed only through the amendment process. 
Non-originalism, obviously by contrast, says the meaning of constitutional provision 
can change by interpretation, as well as by amendment.  
Griswold v. Connecticut,6 in 1965—fifty-one years ago now—was such an 
important case in the Supreme Court, saying it could find rights that were not 
enumerated in the Constitution.7 There, for better or worse, privacy was found by 
Justice William Douglas to be safeguarded in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.8 
Justice Douglas said that there are privacy aspects of the First Amendment, the Third 
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment.9 It led one 
commentator to say that Justice Douglas was like a cheerleader, skipping through 
the Bill of Rights, saying, “Give me a P . . . give me an R . . . an I” and finding 
privacy in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.10 I checked this too, and in the last 
fifty years there is no Supreme Court justice that has ever again found rights in 
penumbras or emanations. 
The debate over unenumerated rights has continued. On the current Court, 
justices such as Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas declare themselves to be 
originalists.11 Many justices of course embrace non-originalism.12 In confirmation 
hearings of Supreme Court justices, there have been battles over non-originalism 
and originalism. The most obvious of these was in 1987, when Robert Bork was 
nominated for the Supreme Court and rejected, in large part, because of his views 
about constitutional interpretation.13 In fact, there was an article by Robert Bork in 
1971 titled “Toward Neutral Principles of the First Amendment” that began the idea 
of the meaning of a constitution’s provisions should change only by amendment.14 
He didn’t use the word originalism—that came later—but it was one of the most 
                                                
6 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
7 Id. at 482–83. 
8 Id. at 483. 
9 Id. at 483–85. 
10 Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The “New” Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: 
A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 84 (1976). 
11 Bradley P. Jacob, Will the Real Constitutional Originalist Please Stand Up?, 40 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 595–96 (2007).  
12 See, e.g., id. at 618 (noting that Justice Stevens is a non-originalist). 
13 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1388–89 
(1990) (book review). 
14 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
INDIANA L.J. 1, 1 (1971) (promoting the idea of “neutral principles” in the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution). 
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important initial defenses of it. Raoul Berger and his book, Government by 
Judiciary,15 advanced this view.16 
But, of course, it was Roe v. Wade,17 in 1973, that really raised consciousness 
of academics, judges, the public, with regard to this debate over constitutional 
interpretation.18 I think it’s fair to say that no Supreme Court decision in the last fifty 
years has been more important with regard to the debate on unenumerated rights 
than Roe v. Wade.  
As I was thinking about this and preparing this lecture, I realized that though 
there has been a heated debate over originalism versus non-originalism—whether 
it’s appropriate for the Court to protect rights that are not enumerated to the 
Constitution—the intellectual disagreement over interpretation hasn’t mattered all 
that much with regard to Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court repeatedly 
over the course of these fifty years has found unenumerated rights to be protected 
by the Constitution.  
The most recent example of this is the right to marry for gay and lesbian 
couples. In Obergefell v. Hodges,19 on June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court focused on 
the right to marry as a fundamental right and found that state laws that prohibit same-
sex marriage are unconstitutional.20 This isn’t the first case to protect the right to 
marry, even though that right isn’t mentioned in the Constitution. Loving v. 
Virginia,21 in 1967, declared unconstitutional a Virginia law preventing interracial 
marriage.22 The Court focused on equal protection, but the Court also explicitly said 
that the right to marry is a fundamental right protected under the Constitution.23 To 
pick other examples, the Supreme Court has said that parents have a fundamental 
right to custody of their children: Stanley v. Illinois,24 in 1973.25 Again, that right is 
not mentioned in the Constitution. The Court has said that there is a constitutional 
right to keep the family together, including the extended family. This was the 
holding in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,26 in 1976.27 Other enumerated rights 
protected in the last half century include the right to engage in private, consensual, 
same-sex sexual activity (Lawrence v. Texas,28 in 2003) and the right of competent 
                                                
15 RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363 (1977). 
16 Id. at 373–73.  
17 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
18 Id. at 152 (1973) (holding that there exists a right of privacy in the penumbras of the 
Bill of Rights). 
19 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
20 Id. at 2599, 2608–09. 
21 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
22 Id. at 11–12. 
23 Id. at 12. 
24 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
25 Id. at 651. 
26 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
27 Id. at 506–07. 
28 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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adults to refuse medical care, even lifesaving medical care (Cruzan v. Director of 
Health Services).29  
These are all basic rights. They are all deemed by the Supreme Court to be 
crucial aspects of our autonomy. Notice all of these are cases in the last fifty years 
and all are unenumerated rights. So, I do think as we look back on the last fifty years, 
especially those of us who write about constitutional law, we have to start by talking 
about this debate over constitutional interpretation over the last half century. But, 
it’s interesting, it hasn’t been one that has kept the Court from protecting 
unenumerated rights.  
 
B.  Shifts in Structure of Federalism and Separation of Powers 
 
The second change that I would identify over the last fifty years has been the 
shift of having the Supreme Court protect the structure of government: federalism 
and separation of powers. From 1937 until 1995, not one federal law was declared 
unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power. 
From 1937 until 1992, only one federal law was found to violate the Tenth 
Amendment and infringe the state’s rights and that case was overruled nine years 
later.30 One of the things that I’ve been doing for a long time now is lecturing to 
students getting ready for the bar exam. I remember when I started doing this, telling 
them if there is an answer to a bar question that says that a federal law exceeds the 
scope of Congress’s commerce power, it’s always a wrong answer. Or, if there is an 
answer that says that a federal law violates the Tenth Amendment, that’s always a 
wrong answer. 
But of course, that’s changed. In United States v. Lopez,31 in 1995, the Supreme 
Court—for the first time since 1937—struck down a federal law as exceeding the 
scope of the commerce power.32 Lopez as you might remember declared 
unconstitutional the Federal Gun-Free School Zone Act (federal law that made it a 
federal crime to have guns within 1000 feet of a school).33 This case led the way to 
other important decisions limiting the scope of the commerce power. In United 
States v. Morrison,34 in 2000, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the civil 
damages provision of the Violence Against Women Act,35 a provision of a federal 
law that allows victims of gender-motivated violence—rape, sexual assault, 
domestic violence—to sue their assailants in federal court.36  
                                                
29 Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). 
30 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985). 
31 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
32 Id. at 551. 
33 See id. 
34 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
35 Id. at 627. 
36 See id. at 605–06. 
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Most recently, in National Federation Business v. Sebelius,37 five justices 
would have said that the individual mandate exceeds the scope of Congress’s 
commerce power—that it was Congress regulating inactivity; people not buying 
insurance—that Congress only can regulate “activity.”38 And, as I mentioned with 
regard to the Tenth Amendment, for so many years the Court left the protection of 
the states to the political process. But in New York v. United States,39 in 1992, and 
in Printz v. United States,40 in 1997, the Court said it violates the Tenth Amendment 
for Congress to commandeer the states, for Congress to force the state to pass laws, 
and enact regulations.41 This enforcement of the structural guarantee of federalism 
was unheard of when this lecture began fifty years ago, but now it is such an 
important part of constitutional law. 
Judicial protection of states has manifested itself in many ways. Just a few years 
ago, in June 2013, in Shelby County v. Holder,42 the Supreme Court for the first time 
since the nineteenth century declared unconstitutional a federal civil rights law 
dealing with race.43 There, the Court declared unconstitutional, a key provision of 
the Voting Rights Act,44 which required that states with a history of race 
discrimination in voting get preapproval before changing their election systems. 
The Supreme Court has tremendously expanded the sovereign immunity of 
state governance over the last fifty years. During the 1960s, the Court was making 
it easier to sue states.45 But, if you look at the cases since then, the Supreme Court 
has limited the ability of Congress to authorize suits against states.46 The Supreme 
Court has said that states not only can’t be sued in federal court, but can’t be sued in 
state court either—even to enforce federal laws.47 
Just as the Court has protected federalism more in the last fifty years than in the 
prior decades, so is that true with regard to separation of powers. From 1950 to 1975, 
I can’t identify a single instance in which a presidential action was declared 
unconstitutional as violating separation of powers. From 1950 until the 1980s, I can’t 
identify a single instance where a federal law was struck down as infringing 
                                                
37 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
38 Id. at 2587. 
39 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
40 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
41 See New York, 505 U.S. at 188; Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.  
42 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
43 Id. at 2618–19. 
44 See id. 
45 See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (holding that a state’s sovereign 
immunity “is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing 
a federally protected right”). 
46 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (“Even 
when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a particular 
area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private 
parties against unconsenting States.”).  
47 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711–12 (1999) (holding that Congress could not 
subject nonconsenting states to private suits in state courts for violation of federal law). 
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separation of powers—where Congress was interfering with the powers of another 
branch of government. But, of course, in 1974, in United States v. Nixon,48 the 
Supreme Court held that President Nixon would violate separation of powers by 
keeping the Watergate tapes secret. The Court said that under separation of powers, 
executive privilege must yield and cannot interfere with the ability of courts to 
perform their essential functions.49  
In the 1980s, in Chadha v. INS,50 the Supreme Court struck down a federal law 
that included legislative veto provisions, which gave Congress the ability by 
resolution to overturn executive actions. This invalidated provisions in 300 federal 
statutes.51 Most recently—just in May of this year—in Zivotofsky v. Kerry,52 the 
Supreme Court struck down a federal law on separation of powers grounds.53 This 
was a law that was adopted in 2002 that said that if an American citizen had a child 
born in Jerusalem, the American citizen could have the child’s passport indicate the 
birthplace as Jerusalem, Israel.54 The Supreme Court, 5–4, said that this infringed 
the president’s sole power to decide whether to recognize foreign governments.55 
The Supreme Court over the last half century then has revived judicial protection of 
the structural guarantees of the Constitution in a way that didn’t exist or rarely 
existed in the prior decades. The Supreme Court would say that it’s gone back to the 
vision of the framers; that the structure of government is the primary protector of 
individual liberties under the Constitution. 
 
C.  Restriction to Court Access 
 
The third change that I would identify in constitutional law over the last half 
century has been the restriction in access to the courts. Now I often remark that if 
the Supreme Court were to hold that the government can give unlimited amounts of 
money to parochial schools, that would make headlines of every newspaper. But if 
the Supreme Court says no one has standing to challenge the government giving 
unlimited amounts of money to parochial schools, no newspapers would pay 
attention at all. Restrictions of access to the courts are largely invisible to the general 
public—maybe to even most attorneys. But a right is meaningless if it can’t be 
enforced. And, I would suggest to you that there have been more restrictions on 
access to the courts imposed in the last half century than in the prior half century 
and by a large multiplier effect.  
In fact, in the 1960s it seemed that the Supreme Court was greatly liberalizing 
access to the courts. It was relaxing barriers like standing. In Flast v. Cohen,56 in 
                                                
48 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
49 Id. at 703–05. 
50 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
51 Id. at 958. 
52 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
53 Id. at 2096. 
54 Id. at 2082. 
55 Id. at 2096. 
56 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
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1969, at the end of the Warren Court, the Supreme Court said taxpayers have 
standing to challenge government expenditures that violate the Establishment 
Clause.57 This involved a law where the federal government was giving financial aid 
directly to parochial schools, and the Court said that the taxpayer, with no other 
injury than that, had standing to bring the suit.58 Since Flast v. Cohen, in every case 
without exception, the Supreme Court has rejected the ability of taxpayers to have 
standing to sue in federal court.59 Initially, the Court rejected taxpayer standing 
outside of the Establishment Clause context, and then the Supreme Court has 
progressively restricted that exception and denied taxpayer standing even to enforce 
the Establishment Clause.60  
In fact, just focusing on standing, there are so many ways in the last half century 
that the Supreme Court has limited who has standing to sue. I’ll just mention a few 
examples. Take City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,61 in 1982. Adolf Lyons was a twenty-
four-year-old African American man.62 He was stopped by a police officer in Los 
Angeles for having a burnt out tail light.63 The officer slammed Lyons’ hands above 
his head; Lyons complained that the keys were cutting into his palm.64 The officer 
then administered a choke hold on Lyons and rendered him unconscious.65 Lyons 
awoke spitting blood and dirt; he had urinated and defecated.66 The officer gave him 
a traffic citation for having a burnt out tail light and let him go.67 Lyons did some 
research and discovered to that point, sixteen people in Los Angeles—almost all like 
him, African American men—had died from the police use of the choke hold.68 He 
sued the city of Los Angeles for an injunction to stop officers from using the choke 
hold except where necessary to protect the officer’s life and safety.69 But the 
Supreme Court ruled that Lyons lacked standing.70 The Supreme Court said a 
plaintiff like Lyons seeking an injunction must show a likelihood that he or she 
personally will suffer the injury again.71 There are hundreds of lower court cases that 
                                                
57 Id. at 105–06. 
58 See id. at 85–86, 105–06. 
59 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209 (1974); DaimlerChrsyler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 
332, 345–46 (2006). 
60 See, e.g., Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 168 (2011) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision devastates taxpayer standing in Establishment 
Clause cases.”).  
61 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
62 Id. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 114–15. 
65 Id. at 115. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 115–16. 
69 Id. at 98 (majority opinion). 
70 Id. at 105–06. 
71 Id. at 111–12. 
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have been dismissed based on City of Los Angeles v. Lyons for standing.72 There is 
ongoing practice—it is apparent that someone will be hurt by it—but there is no 
standing because it cannot be shown that the particular person is likely to be injured 
again.  
Or take a more recent case on standing: Clapper v. Amnesty International.73 In 
2008, Congress amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to allow the 
National Security Agency (“NSA”) to gather information by intercepting 
communications from those in the United States and those in foreign countries.74 
Under the law, the NSA can listen to conversations and read email exchanges.75 
Lawyers brought a challenge to this.76 They said they represented clients in foreign 
countries, in places where the communications were being intercepted. They said 
that they had a duty to protect the attorney-client privilege.77 They said they couldn’t 
communicate by email or phone any longer—that that interfered with their ability to 
protect their clients’ interests.78 The only way to talk to their clients would be 
travel.79 Plaintiffs also included journalists who said they talked to sources in foreign 
countries and their communication was inhibited.80 Business people also were 
plaintiffs and made the same claim.  
But the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 that the suit had to be dismissed for lack of 
standing.81 The Supreme Court said none of the plaintiffs could show that their 
communications were intercepted or likely to be intercepted.82 The NSA doesn’t tell 
people when it’s intercepting their communications, and so, therefore, there was no 
standing.  
When you think of cases like Lyons or Clapper, there’s no analog prior to fifty 
years ago. These are new. The Supreme Court has imposed other standing 
requirements requiring that the plaintiff prove causation.83 The plaintiff must prove 
that a favorable court decision will remedy the injury in order for the plaintiff to 
                                                
72 See, e.g., Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a detainee 
in a county correctional facility lacked standing to challenge county policy of requiring strip 
searches of all detainees); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 
686–89 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge NSA’s Terrorist 
Surveillance Program because they could not prove imminent harm); Schirmer v. Nagode, 
621 F.3d 581, 585–86 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding protesters that were arrested did not have 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of city’s disorderly conduct ordinance). 
73 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
74 Id. at 1144. 
75 Id. at 1143–44. 
76 Id. at 1145. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1145–46. 
80 Id. at 1148. 
81 Id. at 1155. 
82 Id. at 1147–48. 
83 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (holding that 
“a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of” is one element of 
standing). 
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have standing.84 These are very much restrictions on access to the court and typical 
of so many areas where the Supreme Court has done this in the last half century.  
I’ll take another area here to illustrate how over the last half century the 
Supreme Court has so often closed access to the courts. Here, let me talk about 
what’s going on with regard to habeas corpus in the last fifty years. The Warren 
Court very much liberalized habeas corpus. For example, in Fay v. Noia,85 in 1963, 
the Supreme Court said let individuals come to federal court with a writ of habeas 
corpus, unless it can be proven that they deliberately bypassed state proceedings.86 
The attitude in the Warren Court was that if something wasn’t raised in state court, 
it was probably an attorney error. In any event, it’s not fair to bind the criminal 
defendant by that mistake.  
But beginning with the Burger Court and continuing with the Rehnquist and 
the Roberts Courts, the Supreme Court has imposed many new restrictions on habeas 
corpus. The Court, for example, has said that Fourth Amendment claims can’t be 
raised on habeas corpus at all. A criminal defendant cannot argue that the police 
engaged in an illegal search and that the evidence should have been suppressed. This 
was the holding in Stone v. Powell,87 in 1976. The Supreme Court has said if 
something wasn’t raised below, there is a strong presumption that it cannot be raised 
on habeas corpus.88 Wainwright v. Sykes89 said that it could only be raised on habeas 
if the petitioner could show good cause for not being raised and prejudice. This is 
based on the assumption that defendants should be bound by their attorney’s 
choices.90 And then in 1996, Congress adopted the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act that imposes so many additional restrictions on habeas corpus.91 
It says generally one and only one habeas petition.92 It says there is a one-year statute 
of limitations usually from the end of the state court proceedings.93 It says that a 
federal court can grant habeas corpus only if the state court decision was contrary to 
or an unreasonable application of a clearly established law as articulated by the 
Supreme Court.94 Estimates are now, as a result of all of these restrictions, well under 
5% (and some estimates go as low as 2%) of all habeas petitions are granted. It 
means that individuals who are unconstitutionally convicted—even innocent 
individuals—often cannot get their day in court.  
                                                
84 See id. at 561 (holding that it “must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ 
that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision’”) (citations omitted). 
85 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
86 Id. at 438–39. 
87 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
88 Id. at 494–95. 
89 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
90 Id. at 87. 
91 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 101 18 U.S.C. § 440(a) 
(2012).  
92 Id. at § 104 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2254 to prevent successive habeas corpus 
applications with few exceptions). 
93 Id. at § 101. 
94 Id. at § 103. 
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Standing and habeas corpus are examples of restrictions of access to the courts. 
I could mention so many others that have gone on over the last half century that have 
limited the ability of people whose rights have been violated to have access to the 
courts.  
 
D.  An Expansion of Freedom of Speech 
 
The fourth change that I would identify over the last half century is the much 
greater commitment to freedom of speech, except when the institutional interests of 
the Government are at stake. If you look at the course of American history with 
regard to freedom of speech, robust protection of expression is something relatively 
new. I think that the modern era starts just a little bit earlier than a half century ago. 
New York Times v. Sullivan,95 in 1964, is a key case that shifts the Supreme Court’s 
protection of freedom of speech and increases the protection of expression.96 New 
York Times v. Sullivan said that the First Amendment limits the ability of a person, 
who is a public official or running for public office, to win a defamation suit.97 New 
York Times v. Sullivan said that if a plaintiff is a public official or running for public 
office, the plaintiff can win a defamation suit only by proving with clear and 
convincing evidence falsity of the statement and actual malice.98 The Supreme Court 
said that it is essential that there be robust open debate about those holding and 
running for public office.99 The Court said that the freedom of speech needs 
breathing space, so that even false speech is protected by the First Amendment.100 
Harry Kalven, then a professor at the University of Chicago Law School, said that 
New York Times v. Sullivan was an occasion for dancing in the streets, speaking of 
its importance with regard to expression.101 
And I think that the Supreme Court largely over the last half century has been 
very protective of speech. Think of the types of speech that had been restricted in 
the prior fifty years. So many of the most important free speech cases in the prior 
half century dealt with incitement of illegal activity. The Supreme Court was very 
deferential during that prior half century when the government wanted to punish 
people who advocated illegal activity—were advocating to overthrow the United 
States government. But that changed in Brandenburg v. Ohio,102 in 1969, where the 
Supreme Court says a person can be punished for inciting illegal activity only if 
there is a substantial likelihood of imminent illegality and only if the speech is 
                                                
95 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
96 Id. at 292. 
97 See id. at 271. 
98 Id. at 279–80. 
99 Id. at 270–71. 
100 Id. at 271–72. 
101 Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of 
the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (quoting philosopher Alexander 
Meiklejohn). 
102 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
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directed at causing it.103 Since then, the Supreme Court has hardly dealt with the 
issue of incitement and lower courts have been much more protective of speech. 
In the prior half century, so many of the Supreme Court cases and lower court 
cases involved sexual speech, specifically obscenity prosecutions. The last major 
Supreme Court case about obscenity was in 1973, in Miller v. California,104 where 
the Court reformulated the definition of obscenity.105 In large part, I think the 
absence of Supreme Court cases about obscenity is the results of changes in social 
attitudes. Our society has become much more tolerant and permissive with regard to 
sexual speech and so it is not surprising there are fewer prosecutions. But I also think 
it reflects a judiciary that is much more protective of speech than it had been in the 
prior half century.  
Over the last fifty years, the Supreme Court has expanded the types of speech 
that are protected. Earlier in the 1940s, the Court said that commercial advertising 
wasn’t speech protected by the First Amendment at all.106 In the 1970s, the Court 
changed that and said commercial speech is protected, and increasingly there has 
been a robust protection of commercial speech.107  
I think the cases that most reflect the change in attitude by the Supreme Court 
over speech in the last half century are those in where the Court has made clear that 
offensive speech, even very deeply offensive speech, is protected by the First 
Amendment. Snyder v. Phelps108 is illustrative. It involves a small church out of 
Topeka, Kansas—the Westboro Baptist Church—that goes to military funerals and 
uses this as an occasion for expressing a very vile antigay/antilesbian message.109 
Matthew Snyder was a marine who died in military service in Iraq.110 The members 
of the Westboro Baptist Church went to his funeral in Maryland.111 They asked a 
police officer where they could stand; the officer pointed to a spot about one 
thousand feet away from the funeral.112 Before the funeral, they chanted and sang; 
during the funeral they were silent, but they held up signs with offensive slogans.113 
That night, Matthew’s father, Albert, saw on the news footage, where he could read 
the signs; he was deeply offended.114 He sued for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and invasion of privacy.115 The federal court jury awarded him ten million 
dollars in damages, including both compensatory and punitive damages. But the 
United States Supreme Court, in an 8–1 decision, held that the damage award 
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violated the First Amendment.116 Here too, the importance of New York Times v. 
Sullivan is apparent, because it was there that the Court held that tort liability is 
limited by the First Amendment, just like criminal liability is limited by the First 
Amendment.117 But most of all, what Snyder v. Phelps stands for is the proposition 
that speech cannot be the basis of liability or punishment, even though it’s offensive, 
even very deeply offensive.118  
But, there was a “but” in my statement. And that is but the Supreme Court has 
not been protective of speech when the institutional interests of government are at 
stake. So for instance, if it is student speech being regulated by a school, the Supreme 
Court has not been protective of student expression much at all. Early in these fifty 
years in Tinker v. Des Moines Board of Education,119 the Court eloquently declared 
that students don’t leave their free speech rights at the schoolhouse gate. But in every 
speech case involving students since then, the Supreme Court has ruled for the 
Government against the students.120 The most recent case, Morse v. Frederick,121 in 
2007, is illustrative. The Olympic torch was coming through Juneau, Alaska.122 A 
school released its students to stand on the sidewalk and watch.123 A student got 
together with his friends and held up a banner that said quote, “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS.”124 At the oral argument, Justice Souter said he had no idea what that 
meant.125 But the principal thought it was a message to encourage illegal drug use.126 
She confiscated the banner and suspended the students from school.127 The case went 
to the Supreme Court. 5–4 the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the principal of the 
school.128As Justice Stevens said, it’s hard to believe that any student—the smartest 
or the slowest—are more likely to use marijuana because of this banner.129 The Court 
didn’t require any showing of that. The Court just deferred to the school.  
Another example where the institutional interests of government are at stake is 
the speech of government employees. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,130 in 2006, the 
Supreme Court said there is no free speech protection for the speech of government 
employees on the job in the scope of their duties.131 Speech on military bases is 
                                                
116 Id. 
117 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 291–92 (1964). 
118 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 460–61. 
119 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
120 Id. at 506. 
121 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
122 Id. at 397. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) 
(No. 06-278). 
126 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 398 (2007). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 395. 
129 Id. at 444.  
130 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
131 Id. at 425–26. 
2016] FIFTY YEARS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  701 
another example. I argued a case in the Supreme Court two years ago, United States 
v. Apel,132 about the right of a person to demonstrate on a public area of a military 
base—actually the side of a major public road, the Pacific Coast Highway.133 I lost 
by the close margin of nine to nothing.134 So yes, there is a far greater commitment 
now by the Supreme Court, lower courts, and our society to freedom of speech. But 
this is a commitment that ends when there’s an institutional interest of the 
government at stake.  
 
E.  An Increased Emphasis on Equality 
 
The fifth and final change that I would identify is a much greater commitment 
to equality on the part of the Supreme Court, though it’s often least manifest with 
regard to racial equality and especially with regard to racial equality in schools. It 
might surprise you, if you haven’t studied constitutional law recently, to know that 
it wasn’t until 1971, in Reed v. Reed,135 that the Supreme Court for the first time in 
American history found sex discrimination unconstitutional.136 It wasn’t until a few 
years after that that the Supreme Court for the first time indicated that some form of 
heightened scrutiny would be used for sex discrimination.137 It wasn’t until 1976 that 
the Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren138 formulated the test we know as intermediate 
scrutiny and said that is to be used for sex discrimination; sex discrimination will be 
allowed only if it is substantially related to an important government interest.139 It is 
only in the last fifty years that the Supreme Court has protected noncitizens from 
discrimination and that the Court has protected children or nonmarital children from 
discrimination.140 And obviously it’s only in the last fifty years and really only in 
the last twenty years that the Supreme Court has protected gays and lesbians from 
discrimination. The first Supreme Court case ever to protect gays and lesbians from 
discrimination wasn’t until 1996, in Romer v. Evans,141 and the most recent, of 
course, is Obergefell v. Hodges,142 on June 26th of last year.  
So in all of these ways, there’s a much greater commitment to equality. And 
yet, I have to pause when we talk about racial equality. Here, the Supreme Court’s 
record is much more mixed, if not even dismal. The Supreme Court over these last 
fifty years has held that disparate impact isn’t enough to prove race discrimination 
under equal protection.143 Or to put it in more formal language of constitutional law, 
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just showing a discriminatory effect isn’t enough to get more than rational basis.144 
Washington v. Davis,145 in 1976, involved a Washington D.C. ordinance that said in 
order to be a police officer, a person had to pass a test.146 Statistics showed that 
African Americans failed that test much more often than whites.147 But the Supreme 
Court said that’s not race discrimination, that’s just a discriminatory effect, 
discriminatory purpose must be proven to establish the existence of a racial 
classification.148 Another example is McCleskey v. Kemp,149 in 1987. It involved a 
man, Warren McCleskey, who had been sentenced to death by a jury in Georgia.150 
A law professor, the late David Baldus from the University of Iowa, did studies to 
prove that the death penalty administered in Georgia was racially discriminatory.151 
The statistics were compelling. But the Supreme Court, 5–4, said that the statistics 
only show a disparate impact and that isn’t enough to establish a racial 
classification.152 The Supreme Court said that the criminal defendant had to prove 
either that the legislature in Georgia adopted the death penalty because of a 
discriminatory purpose or that this jury acted out of discriminatory purpose.153 It’s 
so difficult to prove discriminatory purpose. Rarely anymore, thankfully, will 
decision-makers express racist motivations. And yet, without being able to use 
disparate impact, it is so difficult to deal with the problem of race discrimination in 
society. So much of racism is the result of unconscious, implicit bias. Therefore, 
generally, there’s not going to be the evidence to prove discriminatory intent to 
accompany the disparate impact.  
But where I think the Supreme Court has failed the most with regard to race is 
with regard to school desegregation. Brown v. Board of Education,154 of course, 
came down on May 17, 1954. A decade after Brown, in 1964, virtually nothing had 
been done to achieve desegregation in the South.155 In Alabama, Mississippi and 
South Carolina in 1964, not one African American child was attending school with 
a white child.156 In North Carolina, which has always prided itself on being a more 
progressive southern state, only one-tenth of African Americans were attending 
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school with whites in 1964.157 But then things began to change. In 1964, the Supreme 
Court declared that there has been all too much deliberation and not enough speed.158 
That same year, Congress passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act.159 Title VI says that 
recipients of federal funds can’t discriminate based on race.160 The then Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare said any school system segregated by race would 
be deemed to discriminate and could not get federal funds.161 Every school system 
depends on federal funds.  
From 1964 to 1988, by every measure, American public schools were less 
racially segregated. Since 1988, every year American public schools have become 
more racially segregated.162 And according to UCLA professor Gary Orfield, they’re 
becoming more racially segregated at an accelerating rate.163 And I think Supreme 
Court decisions are largely responsible for this. I point to Milliken v. Bradley,164 in 
1977 that said that there cannot be interdistrict remedies for school segregation.165 
Students generally cannot be taken from suburbs and moved to city schools, or from 
cities and moved to suburban schools. The result is, very little in the way of 
meaningful school desegregation can be achieved. In most major cities, the school 
systems are 80% or 90% more minority students.166 Unless students can be brought 
across district lines, desegregation cannot be achieved. In Oklahoma City v. 
Dowell,167 in 1991, the Supreme Court said once a school system has achieved so-
called unitary status, federal court desegregation orders must end even when it’s 
going to mean the resegregation of the schools.168 And most recently in 2007, in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,169 the 
Supreme Court said that school systems cannot on their own use race as a factor of 
assigning students into their schools to achieve diversity and desegregation.170 These 
cases—Milliken, Oklahoma City v. Dowell, Parents Involved—all are responsible 
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for what has increasingly become separate and unequal schools.171 So that’s why I 
say that generally, there has been a greater commitment to equality by the Supreme 
Court, but it’s been much less evident with regard to race.  
 
II.  THE MOST IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
 
I want to conclude by giving you my opinion of the five most important 
Supreme Court cases over the last half century. And I’ll do that, but I realize it would 
be more useful to conclude by talking about what I regard as the five most 
underappreciated Supreme Court cases.  
As for the most important cases, I will list them alphabetically and begin with 
Baker v. Carr172 and Reynolds v. Sims.173 I’m grouping them together as one. Those 
are the Supreme Court cases that said that challenges to malapportionment of state 
legislatures could be heard by the federal courts and that for any elected body, there 
must be one person, one vote; all districts must be about the same in population. 
When Earl Warren stepped down as Chief Justice, he was asked what were the most 
important rulings during his tenure.174 He pointed to those cases, Baker v. Carr and 
Reynolds v. Sims, since state legislatures never were going to reapportion themselves 
and these rulings were crucial for protecting the democratic process.175  
I would put Bush v. Gore176 on my list of the most important five cases in the 
last fifty years. It is the first time that the Supreme Court played a role in deciding a 
presidential election. Maybe it did decide that presidential election—we’ll never 
know. And certainly I think it’s a case that changed the way many people perceive 
the United States Supreme Court, for better or for worse.  
I would put Obergefell v. Hodges177 on my list of the five most important 
Supreme Court cases in the last fifty years. Obergefell v. Hodges, of course, is the 
case where the Supreme Court said that state laws that prohibit same-sex marriage 
are unconstitutional.178 It’s obviously enormously important for the ability of gays 
and lesbians to marry, but it’s also important in terms of the Supreme Court so 
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emphatically rejecting originalism, so clearly embracing a non-originalist approach 
to interpreting the Constitution.  
I would think that anyone’s list of the five most important cases in the last fifty 
years would also include Roe v. Wade.179 Obviously it’s important for the millions 
of women who have had the chance to decide for themselves whether to continue or 
terminate a pregnancy. But no case has more shaped the public and scholarly debate 
about constitutional interpretation and the role of the courts than Roe v. Wade.  
And fifth on my list of the most important would be United States v. Nixon.180 
Nixon stands for the proposition that no one—not even the president of the United 
States—is above the law.181  
But those are cases that are all familiar. I want to conclude by identifying what 
I regard as the five most underappreciated cases from the Supreme Court from the 
last half century. So again, I’m doing these alphabetically. I would start my list with 
Buckley v. Valeo,182 in 1976. Everyone is familiar with Citizens United v. Federal 
Elections Commission.183 That’s where the Supreme Court held that corporations 
can spend unlimited amounts of money to get candidates elected or defeated.184 But 
Citizens United was very much built on the earlier case in Buckley v. Valeo.185 
Buckley v. Valeo is the case where the Supreme Court said spending money in 
election campaigns is a form of speech.186 Buckley v. Valeo is the case that said that 
the government cannot regulate independent expenditures; that the wealthy have the 
right to spend as much as they want to get candidates elected or defeated.187 The 
Court ruled that expenditure limits are always unconstitutional.188 And Buckley v. 
Valeo, more than any other Supreme Court decision in history, has shaped the very 
nature of our political landscape.  
Second on my list of the most underappreciated cases is Circuit City v. 
Adams,189 in 2001. Of all the cases that I’m talking about tonight, it’s the case that 
affects nearly all of us in this room. It’s Circuit City v. Adams that says that 
arbitration clauses, even in employments contracts, are enforceable and can preclude 
civil rights suits in federal court.190 Circuit City v. Adams involved a man who 
applied for a job at Circuit City.191 He filled out his job application and on the back 
of the application there was a lot of fine print; a lone clause on the back of the job 
application that said that if he ever had any grievances or lawsuits against Circuit 
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City, they would have to go to arbitration.192 He couldn’t go to court. His lawyer 
brought a race discrimination claim on his behalf under California state law in 
California court.193 The lawyer didn’t want it to be removed to federal court.194 But 
Circuit City filed a lawsuit in federal court under a 1925 statute, the Federal 
Arbitration Act, to compel arbitration.195 The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, 
interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act to say that arbitration should be compelled.196 
Of course, it was this case that then paved the way to decisions like AT&T Mobility 
v. Concepcion197 and American Express v. Italian Colors,198 where the Court has 
held that arbitration clauses in employment contracts, consumer contracts, medical 
contracts, are all enforceable.199  
Not long ago I went to see a new eye doctor for the first time and I was given a 
big stack of papers to fill out. In the middle was a form I was asked to sign, that if I 
had any claims against the doctor I could not sue the doctor in court—I’d have to go 
to arbitration. I asked the receptionist if the doctor would still see me if I didn’t sign 
the form. She said she didn’t know. Nobody had ever asked her that question before.  
Around the same time, I bought a new Dell computer, and as you know in order 
to use a computer or an iPad for the first time, you have to click that you’ve read the 
terms, and agree to them. For the iPad, they are forty-six pages long. Well I never 
read—I just click and use the machine. But in this instance, I read the terms. And 
sure enough there was a clause that said that in any claims against Dell with regard 
to the computer, I had to go to arbitration. I couldn’t go to court. I wrote Dell a letter 
saying I did not agree to that clause and by opening the envelope of my letter they 
were agreeing I could sue them in court if there was a dispute. Dell didn’t write back 
but the computer sort of still works. 
Circuit City v. Adams affects all of us because our consumer contracts—maybe 
our employment contracts, maybe our medical contracts—now have arbitration 
clauses and they are enforceable. 
The third case that I would put on my list of the underappreciated is New York 
v. United States,200 in 1992. I briefly mentioned it earlier. The case involved a federal 
law, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, that required that every state 
clean up its nuclear waste by 1996.201 The Supreme Court declared this 
unconstitutional as violating the Tenth Amendment.202 The Supreme Court said that 
Congress violates the Tenth Amendment if it commandeers the states, forcing them 
to enact laws and adopt regulations. Why does this case matter so much? Prior to 
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1992, the Supreme Court, since 1937, had said that the protection of states as states 
is left to the political process. In fact, in a 1985 case, Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transportation District,203 the Supreme Court explicitly said the 
protection of states is left to the political process.204 It’s New York v. United States 
that changes that. It’s New York v. United States that paves the way for all of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions about federalism that I was referring to earlier.  
Fourth on my list of the most underappreciated cases is San Antonio Board of 
Education v. Rodriguez,205 in 1973. The case involved a challenge to the Texas 
system of funding public schools largely through local property taxes.206 The result 
was that poor areas had to tax at a very high rate and had relatively little to spend on 
education.207 Wealthy areas could tax at a low rate and had a great deal to spend on 
education.208 But the Supreme Court, 5–4, upheld the Texas system.209 Justice Lewis 
Powell wrote for the Court. He was joined by the other three Nixon appointees: 
Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, and an Eisenhower appointee Potter Stewart.210 
In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court said that poverty is not a suspect classification, 
discrimination against the poor doesn’t get more than rational basis review, and 
education is not a fundamental right.211 Rodriguez, together with cases like Milliken 
v. Bradley, that I mentioned earlier, have led to separate and unequal schools in the 
United States, something that plagues and affects all of us.212  
Fifth and finally on my list of underappreciated cases is Terry v. Ohio,213 in 
1968. Terry v. Ohio is the case that says that police can stop and frisk only on the 
basis of reasonable suspicion; they don’t need to have probable cause in order to be 
able to stop and frisk.214 What’s interesting is there’s now been a release of some of 
the justices’ papers from that time. We know that especially Justice Thurgood 
Marshall was very concerned about how the police would use this greater authority 
to stop and to frisk, especially against people of color.215 The experience of the last 
several years confirms that the discretion of the police to stop and to frisk often is 
used in a racially discriminatory way. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
I was thinking of trying to conclude by projecting ahead fifty years and imagine 
what the professor is going to be talking about when he or she gives the 100th 
anniversary of the Leary Lecture. And then I realized that’s impossible. No one fifty 
years ago could have imagined things like the rise of fundamentalism across the 
globe and the terrors that resulted from it. Technological changes, like the internet, 
that so alter the way in which we communicate and express ourselves, could not 
have been imagined. The moral changes, such as the recognition of rights for gays 
and lesbians, including the right to marriage equality—would have been unthinkable 
a half century ago.  
So I conclude with the one prediction I’m sure about. I truly believe that over 
the next fifty years there will be, as there was in the prior fifty years, an expansion 
of freedom; an increase in equality. Because here I believe, and I’ll conclude with 
this, that the late Dr. Martin Luther King got it right when he said, “The arc of the 
moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.”216  
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